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CLASHING POLICIES OR CONFUSING PRECEDENTS: 
THE “GROSS NEGLIGENCE” EXCEPTION TO 
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES DISCLAIMERS 
MICHAEL PILLOW 
ABSTRACT 
Consequential damages can easily amount to millions of dollars. 
Commercial parties often disclaim consequential damages in their con-
tracts. This Article posits that such disclaimers between commercial parties 
under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) should not be found unen-
forceable based on gross negligence. Article 2 of the UCC promotes the 
policy of freedom of contract. Consistent with that policy, section 2-719 of 
the UCC provides that contractual consequential damages disclaimers 
should be enforceable absent a finding of unconscionability. This Article 
analyzes the interplay among UCC section 2-719, “public policy” exceptions 
to enforcing limitations of liability, and the law of gross negligence. This 
Article concludes that but for those rare circumstances in which a commer-
cial buyer may invoke unconscionability, courts should uphold consequen-
tial damages disclaimers absent a clear showing of willful misconduct. This 
standard provides a more discernible “bright-line” that comports with the 
general treatment of economic losses under the UCC. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There are several points that have attained clarity regarding the en-
forceability of limitations of liability under the Uniform Commercial Code 
(UCC). Most importantly, agreed risk allocations under section 2-719 be-
tween sophisticated business entities are generally upheld. One notable 
exception to this point stems from “public policy” considerations, essen-
tially arising from a seller’s alleged willful misconduct, gross negligence, 
or similar wrongful acts.1 A second clear point is that courts may apply the 
unconscionability doctrine to overturn grossly unfair contract terms, in-
cluding consequential damages disclaimers or other liability limitations.2 
This doctrine is largely restricted to the consumer or unsophisticated buyer 
context. A third point attaining clarity is that case decisions dealing specif-
ically with sales of goods under Article 2 differ only somewhat from cases 
applying the common law. 
At least two points remain unsettled. A split of authority still exists re-
garding whether a limited remedy that “fails of its essential purpose” also 
invalidates a consequential damages disclaimer or other monetary limita-
tion on damages.3 Further, this Article posits that court decisions reflect 
dissonance, if not outright confusion, on what types of “bad acts” can ne-
gate an otherwise valid limitation on public policy grounds. One principal 
problem concerns the legal line of demarcation between gross negligence 
and intentional misconduct. Some courts use gross negligence or any con-
duct greater than ordinary negligence.4 Others employ such terms as reck-
lessness, reckless disregard, or bad faith.5 
Refusing to enforce commercial limitations of liability based on a nebu-
lous concept of gross negligence clearly appears to conflict with the ascend-
ant policy of freedom of contract.6 Such refusals are also inconsistent with 
both the text and purpose of section 2-719 and associated UCC provisions.7 
This Article explores the primary impediments to enforcing a seller’s 
contractual limitations of liability in the commercial setting. It focuses on 
consequential damage disclaimers under the UCC. This Article suggests 
                                                 
1 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195 (1979). 
2 See U.C.C. § 2-719 (2012). 
3 See Fiorito Bros. v. Fruehauf Corp., 747 F.2d 1309, 1314 (9th Cir. 1984). 
4 See NMP Corp. v. Parametric Tech. Corp., 958 F. Supp. 1536, 1546 (N.D. Okla. 1997). 
5 See Marriott Corp. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 723 A.2d 454, 462 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. 1998). 
6 See Colnaghi, U.S.A., Ltd. v. Jewelers Prot. Servs., Ltd., 611 N.E.2d 282, 283–84 
(N.Y. 1993). 
7 See U.C.C. § 2-719. 
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that, except in those rare circumstances in which a buyer may invoke un-
conscionability, courts should uphold consequential damages disclaimers 
per the contract terms, absent a clear showing of willful misconduct, that 
is, intentional “bad acts” by the seller. This standard provides a much 
more discernible “bright-line” test for courts to apply. Numerous federal 
and state cases demonstrate beyond cavil that the law affords no consistent 
conception of gross negligence.8 Unenforceability based on gross negli-
gence also runs counter to established precedents limiting recovery of 
economic losses in tort. The analysis recommended here also accords with 
the better-reasoned cases’ conclusion that a failure of essential purpose does 
not automatically invalidate a consequential damages disclaimer. 
To illustrate the importance of this issue, imagine the following realis-
tic scenario. Two large, sophisticated companies negotiate a multimillion-
dollar contract for supplying complex equipment and ancillary installation 
services.9 The contract includes a limitation of liability consistent with the 
particular industry’s standards. During negotiations, the buyer seeks to in-
clude an exclusion or exception to the limitation for any situation involving 
the seller’s gross negligence. Seller begrudgingly assents only if the parties 
could agree on a definition for gross negligence. The seller’s counsel drafts 
a definition essentially requiring “intentional” acts, which the buyer de-
clines. Ultimately, the parties consciously leave out any reference regard-
ing gross negligence in the liability limitation. During the course of sell-
er’s performance, the seller’s product malfunctions numerous times. The 
seller responds to buyer’s warranty claims, and is finally able to make the 
product work after many months and several repairs. Meanwhile, the buy-
er suffers lost profits, business interruption, and other economic losses far 
exceeding the contract price. It seeks to avoid all limitations, particularly 
the consequential damages disclaimers, based on seller’s gross negligence 
in manufacturing and equipment installation. Under current law in most 
United States jurisdictions, the buyer might prevail. 
I. LIMITATIONS OF LIABILITY UNDER THE UCC 
UCC section 2-719 expressly allows parties to agree on contractual limi-
tations to the remedies otherwise afforded to the parties under the respective 
                                                 
8 See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 72 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
9 Contracts involving both goods and services are considered “hybrid” contracts that 
are analyzed as to whether the UCC applies under either the “predominant purpose” test 
(majority rule) or the “gravamen of the action” test (minority approach). See JAMES J. 
WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, PRINCIPLES OF SALES LAW § 2-1, at 32–33 (2009) 
[hereinafter WHITE & SUMMERS, PRINCIPLES]. 
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UCC provisions.10 Such limitations can take various forms, including use of 
liquidated damages in certain instances.11 Probably the two most common 
means for a seller to limit its liability in commercial contracts consist of 
limitations on the total amount of recoverable damages (commonly referred 
to as “caps”) and “consequential damages disclaimers.”12 A somewhat sim-
plified sample limitation may be drafted along the following lines: 
Seller is not liable to Buyer, whether as a result of breach of 
contract, warranty, indemnity, tort (including negligence), 
strict liability or otherwise for 
(a) lost profits or revenues, business loss or interruption, claims 
of Buyer’s customers, or for any special, consequential, inci-
dental, indirect or punitive damages, or 
(b) any amounts in excess of the contract price paid to Seller. 
The foregoing limitations of liability do not apply in the case 
of liabilities arising from Seller’s willful misconduct or fraud. 
A few points about this language should be noted. First, the limitation 
attempts to shield the Seller from liability under some specific legal bases 
                                                 
10 U.C.C. § 2-719 provides as follows: 
§ 2-719. Contractual Modification or Limitation of Remedy. 
Subject to the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this section and of 
the preceding section on liquidation and limitation of damages, the 
agreement may provide for remedies in addition to or in substitution for 
those provided in this Article and may limit or alter the measure of 
damages recoverable under this Article, as by limiting the buyer’s remedies 
to return of the goods and repayment of the price or to repair and 
replacement of non-conforming goods or parts; and resort to a remedy as 
provided is optional unless the remedy is expressly agreed to be exclusive, 
in which case it is the sole remedy. 
Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its 
essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this Act. 
Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation or 
exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential damages for injury 
to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable 
but limitation of damages where the loss is commercial is not. 
U.C.C. § 2-719 (2012). 
11 See id. 
12 See id. Liability limits are much more relevant to a seller. First, sellers cannot normally 
seek consequential damages under section 2-715. WHITE & SUMMERS, PRINCIPLES, supra 
note 9, § 8-16, at 457. Second, a buyer’s “performance” will primarily consist of payment. 
Buyers may sometimes have additional obligations, such as transportation of goods, 
providing access to their factory or affording certain technical assistance. In these instances, 
buyers may seek “reciprocal” limitations of liability. These pose additional challenges, 
since they could be applied to the payment obligations as well. 
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as well as “otherwise.” The latter term may serve as shorthand for “any 
other legal theory.” Courts tend to interpret limitations of liability strictly, 
and at least require that the limiting language cover the specific claims 
raised in a lawsuit brought by a disgruntled buyer.13 For example, to en-
hance enforceability, if a buyer sues based on a negligence theory, a sell-
er’s limitation should contain that word in the disclaimer. 
Second, the disclaimer mentions specific categories of damages (typi-
cally those relevant to the particular product, contract, or industry) along 
with general categories. Fundamentally, the disclaimer intends to restrict a 
buyer to what one may consider “direct” damages. It also covers more than 
“consequential” damages. General damages terms may be interpreted in 
various ways. For example, the dividing line between “incidental” and 
“consequential” is not always clear.14 Even “lost profits” may be considered 
“direct” rather than “consequential” in certain circumstances.15 
Third, the limitation of liability carves out fraud and willful miscon-
duct. Such actions by a seller may render the limitation unenforceable in 
court as discussed below.16 Sellers and their counsel perhaps reasonably 
conclude that a court will more likely enforce the limitation if such recog-
nized exceptions have been explicitly accepted. 
A buyer challenging a consequential damages disclaimer must first es-
tablish that consequential damages may be claimed.17 Although the UCC 
uses different language for consequential damages than the basic common 
law “foreseeability” test, courts have generally employed the familiar test 
under the Code nonetheless.18 In the large majority of business disputes 
                                                 
13 See, e.g., New Light Co. v. Wells Fargo Alarm Servs., 525 N.W.2d 25, 31 (Neb. 1994); 
Great N. Ins. Co. v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., 517 F. Supp. 2d 723, 752 (W.D. Pa. 2007). 
14 See Firwood Mfg. Co. v. Gen. Tire, Inc., 96 F.3d 163, 173 (6th Cir. 1996) (interest charges). 
15 See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 10-2, 
at 375–76 (5th ed. 2006); Penncro Assocs., Inc. v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., 499 F.3d 1151, 
1156 (10th Cir. 2007). The Penncro court cited an example of a services contract where a 
party expected a profit as part of the benefit of its bargain. Id. One may also consider 
breaches of confidentiality or intellectual property agreements as involving more direct 
claims for lost profits. 
16 See infra notes 53–71 and accompanying text. 
17 See Thomas Diamond & Howard Foss, Consequential Damages for Commercial Loss: 
An Alternative to Hadley v. Baxendale, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 665, 667–69 (1994). 
18 See id. at 670–71. The authors of Consequential Damages Alternative address con-
cerns with the ambiguous and inflexible standard of Hadley v. Baxendale. They propose a 
trifurcated approach to consequential damages claims, taking into account various policy 
considerations and the level of a seller’s knowledge of the consequences of breach. This 
would serve as a “default” approach when the parties have not contractually allocated the 
risk of consequential damages. Hence, their recommendations do not seem inconsistent 
with the primary tenets of this Article. 
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between sophisticated entities, a buyer should readily overcome this initial 
hurdle inasmuch as a seller would presumably recognize such implications 
of a breach. 
A buyer may then dispute a limitation on the basis that it is unconscion-
able. Under UCC section 2-719, “[c]onsequential damages may be limited 
or excluded unless the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable.”19 Un-
conscionability is measured at the time of contracting under section 2-302.20 
As one commentator has suggested, “[a] principled application of uncon-
scionability must strike a balance between the need for fairness and the need 
for certainty.”21 The most widely accepted test for unconscionability in-
volves both procedural and substantive aspects: “an absence of meaningful 
choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which 
are unreasonably favorable to the other party.”22 
Sample language along the lines shown above may exist in a seller’s 
standard terms or may result from negotiations. Unquestionably, a seller 
stands a better chance at enforcing negotiated terms rather than boilerplate 
terms, even putting aside battle of forms scenarios.23 With standard terms, 
a buyer may concoct stronger arguments based on lack of meaningful 
choice and unreasonable contract terms. In commercial cases, this doctrine 
has been applied sparingly as courts rationalize that parties have relatively 
equal bargaining power.24 
Public Service Co. of New Hampshire v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. 
(PSNH) exemplifies the courts’ reluctance to find limitations of liability 
unconscionable in a commercial setting.25 In PSNH, the buyer asserted that 
“standard” contractual limitations were unconscionable because such terms 
were “forced” on it due to disparity in bargaining positions, owed in part to 
the “duopolistic” nature of the industry at that time.26 The federal district 
court rejected this contention, initially questioning the doctrine’s applicabil-
ity in a commercial contract involving millions of dollars.27 It indicated that 
                                                 
19 U.C.C. § 2-719 (2012). 
20 Id. § 2-302. 
21 Jane P. Mallor, Unconscionability in Contracts Between Merchants, 40 SW. L.J. 1065, 
1085 (1986). 
22 Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
23 See Jonathan A. Eddy, On the “Essential” Purposes of Limited Remedies: The 
Metaphysics of UCC Section 2-719(2), 65 CALIF. L. REV. 28, 80 n.179 (1977). 
24 See, e.g., K & C, Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 263 A.2d 390, 393 (Pa. 1970); 
WHITE & SUMMERS, PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, § 13-11, at 710. 
25 Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 685 F. Supp. 1281, 1288–89 
(D.N.H. 1988). 
26 Id. at 1288. 
27 Id. 
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standard terms could be used without rendering them invalid.28 Moreover, 
the court found that both parties were sizable business entities, who had 
arrived at contract terms after months of negotiations.29 As another court 
found in rejecting unconscionability defenses, “the buyer was hardly the 
sheep keeping company with wolves that it would have us believe.”30 
Thus, it appears that an argument against limitations of liability based 
directly on unconscionability will most likely be dead on arrival, absent 
unique circumstances. An indirect approach to avoiding consequential dam-
ages disclaimers has been derived from the section 2-719 language dealing 
with failure of essential purpose.31 
II. STRIKING DISCLAIMERS BASED ON FAILURE OF ESSENTIAL PURPOSE 
Although the UCC generally allows limited remedies, exclusivity may not 
apply to the extent that “circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to 
fail of its essential purpose.”32 Courts construe this language to operate when 
either party has been deprived of the substantial value of its bargain.33 The most 
common scenarios involve a seller’s inability or unwillingness to effect warran-
ty repairs within a reasonable time.34 The seller’s negligence or bad faith is not 
considered relevant to this aspect of the issue.35 
Case law reflects greater discord on the further question of whether a 
finding of “failure of essential purpose” also negates the consequential 
damages disclaimer.36 In simple terms, buyers argue that a failure of es-
sential purpose entitles them to all Article 2 remedies, one of which is con-
sequential damages.37 The counterargument is that these provisions are 
                                                 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 K & C, Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 263 A.2d 390, 393 (Pa. 1970). 
31 U.C.C. § 2-719 (2012). 
32 Id. 
33 See, e.g., Transp. Corp. of Am., Inc. v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 30 F.3d 953, 959 (8th 
Cir. 1994); see also Eddy, supra note 23, at 38; John E. Murray, Jr., Unconscionability: 
Unconscionability, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 46 (1969). See generally Roy Ryden Anderson, 
Failure of Essential Purpose and Essential Failure on Purpose: A Look at Section 2-719 of 
the Uniform Commercial Code, 31 SW. L.J. 759, 766 (1977). 
34 See Transp. Corp. of Am., 30 F.3d at 959; Eddy, supra note 23, at 29; Murray, 
supra note 33, at 51; Anderson, supra note 33, at 768; Beal v. Gen. Motors Corp., 354 F. 
Supp. 423, 425 (D. Del. 1973). 
35 See Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. Nat’l Cash Register Corp., 635 F.2d 1081, 1085 (3d Cir. 1980); 
S. M. Wilson & Co. v. Smith Int’l, Inc., 587 F.2d 1363, 1374–75 (9th Cir. 1978). 
36 See Fiorito Bros. v. Fruehauf Corp., 747 F.2d 1309, 1314 (9th Cir. 1984). 
37 See id. at 1315; Soo Line R.R. v. Fruehauf Corp., 547 F.2d 1365, 1373 (8th Cir. 1977). 
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independent and should be construed separately.38 A third approach relies 
on a case-by-case assessment.39 
One commentator recently conducted an extensive analysis of the UCC 
language and case law.40 He suggests that “[c]onsequential damages should 
be available when a limited or exclusive remedy fails of its essential purpose 
(1) only if the parties have not waived them for breach of warranty and/or 
breach of contract and (2) only as of the date the essential purpose of the lim-
ited remedy fails.”41 This proposal clearly merits consideration because it 
would provide a potential means for reconciling the disparate approaches 
while promoting freedom of contract. It appears that no court has yet adopted 
this approach.42 Pending such a development, results will vary depending on 
the jurisdiction and factual setting, with much of the case law arising in the 
federal courts.43 
This Article posits that courts that view sections 2-719(2) and (3) in-
dependently proffer the best analysis consistent with freedom of contract. 
As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals stated: 
The limited remedy of repair and a consequential damages exclusion are 
two discrete ways of attempting to limit recovery for breach of warranty.... 
The Code, moreover, tests each by a different standard. The former 
survives unless it fails of its essential purpose, while the latter is valid 
unless it is unconscionable.... We therefore see no reason to hold, as a 
general proposition, that the failure of the limited remedy provided in the 
contract, without more, invalidates a wholly distinct term in the agreement 
excluding consequential damages. The two are not mutually exclusive.44 
The court then analyzed the circumstances surrounding the discrete pro-
visions and concluded that there was nothing unconscionable about enforc-
ing the parties’ agreed risk allocation disclaiming consequential damages.45 
Unfortunately, the court left an opening during its analysis by stating that 
                                                 
38 See Chatlos Sys., 635 F.2d at 1086. 
39 See Cole Energy Dev. Co. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 678 F. Supp. 208, 211 (C.D. Ill. 1988). 
40 See Robert J. Williams, Getting What You Bargained For: How Courts Might Provide 
a Coherent Basis for Damages That Arise When Remedies Fail of Their Essential Purpose, 
5 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 131, 134 (2010). 
41 Id. at 136. 
42 Research has disclosed no cases citing Williams’ article. 
43 See Williams, supra note 40, at 135. One explanation for the preponderance of federal 
court decisions might be that commercial litigators prefer federal courts over state courts. 
Cases originally commenced in state courts can of course be removed to a cognizant federal 
court under 42 U.S.C. § 1441 et seq. (2012). 
44 Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. Nat’l Cash Register Corp., 635 F.2d 1081, 1086 (3d Cir. 1980). 
45 See id. at 1087. 
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it was “not a case where the seller acted unreasonably or in bad faith.”46 
Some later courts have seized upon this language and suggested that a bad 
faith exception may apply.47 If so, this would effectively require the case-
by-case approach adopted by some courts as mentioned above. Other 
courts have dismissed this contention on the basis that the question of 
“good faith” or “bad faith” constitutes an entirely separate question under 
the UCC.48 Therefore, the uncertain role that “bad faith” may play further 
clouds the enforceability of consequential damages disclaimers. 
The conclusion that a consequential damages disclaimer may survive a 
“failure of essential purpose” does not necessarily extend to other liability 
limitations. Section 2-719(3) only mentions consequential damages.49 In a 
typical situation, such as our initial scenario, a seller undertakes warranty 
repairs at its cost. A seller may incur repair costs, which would probably be 
considered “direct” rather than consequential in nature.50 If a court finds 
that a warranty has failed of its essential purpose, a seller may not be able to 
invoke its “cap” on liability for such direct costs and could therefore have 
unlimited liability to effect repairs.51 In short, the second part of the sample 
limitation above would not be enforced. 
This resolution—allowing a buyer unlimited repair costs but no lost 
profits or other consequential damages—may not fully compensate a buyer, 
especially one whose product is never fixed. However, in situations entail-
ing significant technical, technological, or commercial risks, the parties 
remain free to tailor their contracts to the situation.52 A seller spending in-
ordinate sums effecting repairs will have ample incentives to make ac-
commodations. In some circumstances, a seller must also recognize that 
public policy may still limit its limitations. 
III. THE “PUBLIC POLICY” EXCEPTION FOR LIMITATIONS OF LIABILITY 
The common law refuses to enforce exculpatory clauses in contracts in 
which enforcement would violate public policy.53 As expressed by the 
                                                 
46 Id. 
47 See Canal Elec. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 548 N.E.2d 182, 187 n.6 (Mass. 1990). 
48 See Bray Int’l, Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., No. CIV H-02-0098, 2005 WL 
3371875, at *4 (S.D. Tex. 2005). 
49 See U.C.C. § 2-719 (2012). 
50 See, e.g., Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 418 F. Supp. 435, 
459–60 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
51 See id. 
52 See, e.g., Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. Nat’l Cash Register Corp., 635 F.2d 1081, 1087 (3d 
Cir. 1980). 
53 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195 (1979). 
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New York Court of Appeals, “an exculpatory agreement, no matter how 
flat and unqualified its terms, will not exonerate a party from liability un-
der all circumstances. Under announced public policy, it will not apply to 
exemption of willful or grossly negligent acts.”54 Other courts have added 
an additional, related exception for contracts that are intrinsically tied to 
the public interest.55 This “public policy” concept has been extended to 
contracts containing limitations of liability for a breach or other fault, as 
opposed to exempting or exculpating another party from any liability.56 
Courts have struggled with the public policy exception in several 
ways. As one court aptly summarized the fundamental tension, “[f]earing 
the disruptive effect that invocation of the highly elusive public policy prin-
ciple would likely exert on the stability of commercial and contractual rela-
tions, Maryland courts have been hesitant to strike down voluntary bargains 
on public policy grounds.”57 Further, courts sometimes confuse precedents 
discussing exculpatory clauses with those addressing liability limitations. 
This is evidenced in part by cases citing section 195 of the Restatement of 
Contracts that addresses only exemptions from liability, which in reality 
equate to exculpatory clauses.58 Some courts fortunately recognize the dis-
tinction. “[W]hereas exculpatory clauses are generally disfavored by courts 
and subject to strict construction standards, limitation of liability clauses are 
not disfavored and are construed under the general rules applying to con-
tract interpretation.”59 
As always, context matters. Much of the case law on exculpatory claus-
es developed outside the commercial sphere. In some consumer contexts, 
one cannot legally achieve complete exoneration, even for ordinary negli-
gence.60 It is relatively easier to understand a broad reluctance with pure 
exculpatory clauses, than any hesitation associated with limitations on rem-
edies. Exculpatory clauses seek to shield a company from any liability.61 
                                                 
54 Kalisch-Jarcho v. City of New York, 448 N.E.2d 413, 416 (N.Y. 1983). 
55 See Md. Nat’l Capital Park & Planning Comm’n v. Wash. Nat’l Arena, 386 A.2d 
1216, 1229 (Md. 1978); Wolf v. Ford, 644 A.2d 522, 525 (Md. 1994). 
56 See Sommer v. Fed. Signal Corp., 593 N.E.2d 1365, 1370–71 (N.Y. 1992). 
57 Md. Nat’l Capital Park, 386 A.2d at 1228. 
58 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195. 
59 Royal Indem. Co. v. Sec. Guards, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 2d 497, 502 (E.D. Pa. 2003); see 
also Great N. Ins. Co. v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., 517 F. Supp. 2d 723, 752 n.29 (W.D. Pa. 
2007). Many of the decisions involving interpretations of limitation of liability provisions 
use the term “exculpatory” when referring to limitation of liability clauses. As noted above, 
this is a distinction with a very real difference, and has resulted in confusion and inconsis-
tent results in the state appellate and federal district courts. 
60 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195 cmt. a. 
61 See, e.g., Roopchan v. ADT Sec. Sys., Inc., 781 F. Supp. 2d 636, 642 (E.D. Tenn. 
2011); Platt v. Gateway Int’l Motorsports Corp., 813 N.E.2d 279, 283 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). 
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Limitations of liability, on the other hand, seek to do precisely what the 
term suggests: limit rather than exempt a company from liability.62 Many 
commercial contracts contain interrelated provisions concerning warranty 
limitations and exclusive remedies, in addition to liability limitations.63 Alt-
hough one may contend that the net collective effect of these provisions ac-
complishes much the same thing as an exculpatory clause, the two concepts 
cannot be considered equal.64 
When analyzing limitations of liability between sophisticated parties, 
courts focus on the conscious risk allocations.65 Much of the case law devel-
oped from disputes in industries such as energy and power generation, com-
puter systems, and building alarm systems.66 One may often find a discernible, 
if not universally accepted, industry practice underpinning the express terms.67 
The UCC clearly allows limitations on the quantum of remedies, provid-
ed “that at least minimum adequate remedies [remain] available.”68 Neither 
section 2-719(3) nor its associated comments mention public policy as a fur-
ther constraint on consequential damages disclaimers.69 Buyers, moreover, 
retain the right to claim non-consequential damages up to the limit contained 
in the contract.70 Such damages may not satisfy a buyer that sustains signifi-
cant economic harm. In response, buyers and their counsel have accordingly 
devised other theories to overcome contractual limitations, primarily by assert-
ing tort claims.71 
                                                 
62 See generally WHITE & SUMMERS, PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, § 13-11, at 708. 
63 See id. 
64 Great N. Ins. Co., 517 F. Supp. 2d at 749. 
65 For example, in Canal Electric, the court found that consequential damages disclaimers 
such as that used by Westinghouse constituted a norm in the power generation industry and 
represented “a reasonable accommodation between two commercially sophisticated parties.” 
Canal Elec. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. 548 N.E.2d 182, 185 (Mass. 1990). 
66 With respect to the power generation industry, see Arkwright-Boston Mfrs. Mut. Ins. 
Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 844 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir. 1988); Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H. v. 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 685 F. Supp. 1281 (D.N.H. 1981); Am. Elec. Power Co. v. 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 418 F. Supp. 435 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Canal Elec., 548 N.E.2d at 
182; N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 564 A.2d 919 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1989). With respect to alarm systems, see Am. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Rest Assured Alarm Sys., 
Inc., 786 F. Supp. 2d 798, 798, 802 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Great N. Ins. Co., 517 F. Supp. 2d at 
723, 729, 735; Synnex Corp. v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., 928 A.2d 37, 45 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2007). See generally Marjorie A. Shields, Validity, Construction, and Application 
of Exculpatory and Limitation of Liability Clauses in Burglary, Fire, and Other Home and 
Business Monitoring Service Contracts, 36 A.L.R. 6TH 305 (2008). 
67 See Southland Farms, Inc. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 575 So. 2d 1077, 1077–79 (Ala. 
1991); Canal Elec., 548 N.E.2d at 185–86. 
68 U.C.C. § 2-719 (2012). 
69 See id. § 2-719(3). 
70 See, e.g., Canal Elec., 548 N.E.2d at 186. 
71 See cases cited in supra note 66. In virtually all of these cases, tort claims were asserted. 
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IV. RESTRICTING ECONOMIC LOSS IN TORT 
Against the backdrop of evolving products liability law nationwide, par-
ticularly strict liability under section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, courts confronted commercial claims arising out of contracts yet 
sounding in tort.72 Two watershed cases, the early California Supreme Court 
case of Seely v. White Motor Co.,73 and the United States Supreme Court 
case East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc.,74 addressed 
this duality and restricted contracting parties’ capabilities of asserting claims 
for economic losses in tort.75 
Seely involved a rather straightforward claim for damages for repair costs, 
purchase price payments, and lost profits stemming from an accident involv-
ing a truck used for plaintiff’s business.76 The court upheld the trial court’s 
ruling that the defendant manufacturer was liable for all but the repair costs 
based on a breach of express warranty.77 The court declined to disturb the tri-
al court’s finding that the plaintiff had not proven that the product defect 
caused the physical damage.78 More importantly, in arguable dicta, the court 
refused to apply strict liability, rather than UCC warranty law, to the plain-
tiff’s claims, eloquently stating: 
The distinction that the law has drawn between tort recovery for physical 
injuries and warranty recovery for economic loss is not arbitrary and does 
not rest on the ‘luck’ of one plaintiff in having an accident causing physical 
injury. The distinction rests, rather, on an understanding of the nature of the 
responsibility a manufacturer must undertake in distributing his products. 
He can appropriately be held liable for physical injuries caused by defects 
by requiring his goods to match a standard of safety defined in terms of 
conditions that create unreasonable risks of harm. He cannot be held for the 
level of performance of his products in the consumer’s business unless he 
agrees that the product was designed to meet the consumer’s demands. A 
consumer should not be charged at the will of the manufacturer with bear-
ing the risk of physical injury when he buys a product on the market. He 
can, however, be fairly charged with the risk that the product will not match 
his economic expectations unless the manufacturer agrees that it will.79 
                                                 
72 See Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 147–48 (Cal. 1965); East River S.S. 
Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 859 (1986). 
73 See Seely, 403 P.2d 145. 
74 See East River S.S. Corp., 476 U.S. 858. 
75 See id. at 868–69; Seely, 403 P.2d at 151. 
76 See Seely, 403 P.2d at 147–49. 
77 See id. at 152. 
78 See id. 
79 Id. at 151. 
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In East River Steamship, the United States Supreme Court applied 
what it termed the “majority land-based approach” represented by Seely to 
an admiralty claim for damage to a ship’s turbine.80 The Supreme Court 
held “that a manufacturer in a commercial relationship has no duty under 
either a negligence or strict products-liability theory to prevent a product 
from injuring itself.”81 The Court rationalized that “[t]he increased cost to 
the public that would result from holding a manufacturer liable in tort ... is 
not justified.”82 East River Steamship strongly influenced subsequent deci-
sions and solidified the use of the “economic loss” rule, with some varia-
tions among jurisdictions, to stem the tide of parties pursuing tort claims 
for economic losses, at least absent personal injury or property damage.83 
The trend is well represented by the Florida Supreme Court’s decision 
in Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.84: 
We agree and find no reason to intrude into the parties’ allocation of 
risk by imposing a tort duty and corresponding cost burden on the pub-
lic. We hold contract principles more appropriate than tort principles 
for resolving economic loss without an accompanying physical injury 
or property damage. The lack of a tort remedy does not mean that the 
purchaser is unable to protect himself from loss. We note the Uniform 
Commercial Code contains statutory remedies for dealing with eco-
nomic losses under warranty law, which, to a large extent, would have 
limited application if we adopted the minority view. Further, the pur-
chaser, particularly in a large commercial transaction like the instant 
case, can protect his interests by negotiation and contractual bargaining 
or insurance. The purchaser has the choice to forego warranty protec-
tion in order to obtain a lower price. We conclude that we should refrain 
from injecting the judiciary into this type of economic decision-making.85 
The “economic loss” rule acts as a trade-off in products liability claims. In 
exchange for the somewhat easier tort route afforded by strict liability and 
                                                 
80 See East River S.S. Corp. 476 U.S. at 868, 870. 
81 Id. at 871. 
82 Id. 
83 See, e.g., Jones v. Childers & Talent Servs., Inc., 18 F.3d 899, 904 (11th Cir. 1994); 
Purvis v. Consol. Energy Prods. Co., 674 F.2d 217, 220 (4th Cir. 1982); Jones & Laughlin 
Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 626 F.2d 280, 287 (3d Cir. 1980); Fla. Power 
& Light v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 510 So. 2d 899, 900, 902 (Fla. 1987); Moorman Mfg. 
Co. v. Nat’l Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443, 446 (Ill. 1982); Neibarger v. Universal Coops., Inc., 
486 N.W.2d 612, 624–25 (Mich. 1992). For an excellent overall discussion of the 
“economic loss” doctrine, see Ralph A. Anzivino, The False Dilemma of the Economic Loss 
Doctrine, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 1121 (2010). 
84 Fla. Power & Light, 510 So. 2d at 901–02. 
85 Id. at 902. In Tiara Condo. Ass’n v. Marsh & McLennan Cos., No. SC10-1022, 2013 
WL 828003 (March 7, 2013), the Florida Supreme Court held that Florida’s economic loss 
rule applied only in the products liability context. 
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negligence for personal injuries and property damage, claimants with purely 
economic losses are relegated to warranty and other contract claims.86 
Courts have since wrestled with the types of tort claims barred from asser-
tion in contract. Coverage for simple negligence is clear, at least absent 
property damage or “a substantial and unreasonable risk of death or person-
al injury.”87 Other cases have found that misrepresentations, even if charac-
terized as fraudulent, fall within the ambit of the “economic loss” rule at 
least insofar as they simply re-cast basic contract claims as opposed to alleg-
ing fraud in the inducement.88 The outcome may hinge on whether or not 
the allegations amount to a separate and distinct tort.89 Using the approach 
most courts follow, if intentional torts are covered, this Article maintains 
that ipso facto gross negligence claims should also be swept under the “eco-
nomic loss” umbrella. 
One commentator proposed adopting a “contract-first” approach to re-
solving conflicting tort and contract claims for economic loss, especially the 
“other property” exception.90 This would arguably enhance the economic 
loss rule’s cardinal principles: “(1) to maintain the fundamental distinction 
between tort law and contract law; (2) to protect commercial parties’ free-
dom to allocate economic risk by contract; and (3) to encourage the party 
best situated to assess the risk [of] economic loss, the commercial [buyer], 
to assume, allocate, or insure against that risk.”91 
Clearly, both these principles and the proposed solution appear laudable 
and fully consistent with UCC tenets.92 The commentator enumerates the 
safeguards justifying this approach.93 These otherwise viable safeguards 
include ongoing protection against a seller’s gross negligence.94 In contrast, 
this Article posits that gross negligence should not prevent enforceability of 
a consequential damages disclaimer. 
                                                 
86 See East River S.S. Corp., 476 U.S. at 871–76. 
87 Potomac Constructors v. EFCO Corp., 530 F. Supp. 2d 731, 737 (D. Md. 2008) 
(quoting Council of Co-Owners Atlantis Condo., Inc. v. Whiting-Turner Contracting Co., 
517 A.2d 336, 345 (Md. 1986)); see also cases cited supra note 37. 
88 See Imaging Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Lettergraphics/Detroit, Inc., 178 F.3d 1294, at *2 
(6th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision); Allmand Assocs., Inc. v. Hercules Inc., 960 
F. Supp. 1216, 1216 (E.D. Mich. 1997). 
89 See Action Orthopedics, Inc. v. Techmedica, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 1566, 1570 (M.D. 
Fla. 1991). 
90 See Anzivino, supra note 83, at 1128–30. 
91 Id. at 1142 (quoting Daanen & Janssen, Inc. v. Cedarapids, Inc., 573 N.W.2d 842, 
846 (Wis. 1998)). 
92 See id. at 1133. 
93 See id. at 1133–42. 
94 See id. at 1141–42. The article does not elaborate on the essential difference between 
exculpatory clauses and disclaimers or attempt to reconcile this view with the language of 
the UCC. 
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V. GROSS NEGLIGENCE AS A LIABILITY STANDARD 
Gross negligence was originally conceived as involving either a great 
amount of negligence or a lack of even slight care.95 The term may simply be 
described as “very careless.”96 According to one commentator, some courts 
have construed gross negligence as requiring willful, wanton, or reckless 
misconduct, or such utter lack of all care as will be evidence thereof .... 
But it is still true that most courts consider that “gross negligence” falls 
short of a reckless disregard of the consequences, and differs from 
ordinary negligence only in degree, and not in kind.97 
Indeed, many formulations equate gross negligence with some form of reck-
lessness or conscious disregard.98 Under North Carolina law for example, gross 
negligence “has the same basic elements as negligence, but requires either ‘in-
tentional wrongdoing or deliberate misconduct affecting the safety of others,’ 
such as ‘when the act is done purposely and with knowledge that such act is a 
breach of duty to others.’”99 Under Massachusetts law, gross negligence “falls 
short of being equivalent to a willful and intentional wrong.”100 Louisiana’s 
related concept of “gross fault” has been equated with fraud.101 
The United States Supreme Court discussed various liability standards for 
upholding punitive damages in a section 1983 action based on a showing of 
reckless disregard or indifference to a claimant’s federally protected rights.102 
The Court noted the historical variation among the states in determining the 
proper liability standard for punitive damages, “exacerbated by the ambiguity 
and slipperiness of such common terms as ‘malice’ and ‘gross negli-
gence.’”103 The Court reviewed the standard articulated in prior cases since 
                                                 
95 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 34, at 
211 (5th ed. 1984). 
96 See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 61, 73 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
97 KEETON ET AL., supra note 95, § 34, at 212. 
98 See, e.g., Marriott Corp. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 723 A.2d 454, 462 (Md. 
Ct. Spec. App. 1998); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Noble Lowndes Int’l, Inc., 643 N.E.2d 504, 
506, 508 (N.Y. 1994). 
99 Boykin Anchor Co. v. AT&T Corp., 825 F. Supp. 2d 706, 712 n.6 (E.D.N.C. 2011). 
100 Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Grinnell Corp., 477 F. Supp. 2d 327, 334 (D. Mass. 
2007) (citing Altman v. Aronson, 231 Mass. 588, 591–92 (1919)). 
101 See Occidental Chem. Corp. v. Elliott Turbomachinery Co., 84 F.3d 172, 177 (5th 
Cir. 1996). Here the court found limitations of liability in a warranty clause invalid under 
a Louisiana statute and relied in large measure on a law review article that provided much 
of the basis for drafting the statute. See Saul Litvinoff, Stipulations as to Liability and as 
to Damages, 52 TUL. L. REV. 258, 279 (1978). 
102 See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 33 (1983). 
103 Id. at 39. 
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those cases conflicted as to whether the vague term “gross negligence” could 
serve as the basis for punitive damages.104 Chief Justice Rehnquist’s strong dis-
senting opinion urged a requirement of “wrongful intent” to resolve the con-
flict; gross negligence, however defined, set too amorphous a standard for 
courts to apply.105 
To resolve concerns such as those of Chief Justice Rehnquist, a few 
states have enacted statutory definitions. Texas law requires both an ex-
treme degree of risk and an actual, subjective awareness by the actor.106 
Michigan applies a simpler formulation to support governmental tort im-
munity: “conduct so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern 
for whether an injury results.”107 Oklahoma’s statutory scheme provides a 
general definition for gross negligence: that it “consists ... in the want of 
slight care and diligence.”108 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court cited and quoted the Oklahoma statute in 
a case involving allegations of gross negligence, elaborating that 
[t]he intentional failure to perform a manifest duty in reckless disregard 
of the consequences or in callous indifference to the life, liberty or 
property of another, may result in such a gross want of care for the 
rights of others and of the public that the finding of a willful, wanton, 
deliberate act is justified.109 
A subsequent federal court decision characterized this statement as an “ex-
pounding” of the definition, concluding, “gross negligence is the same as 
                                                 
104 See id. 
105 See id. at 57 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
106 See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.001 (West 2003). This statute provides 
in pertinent part: 
(11) “Gross negligence” means an act or omission: 
(A) which when viewed objectively from the standpoint of the 
actor at the time of its occurrence involves an extreme degree of 
risk, considering the probability and magnitude of the potential 
harm to others; and 
(B) of which the actor has actual, subjective awareness of the risk 
involved, but nevertheless proceeds with conscious indifference 
to the rights, safety, or welfare of others. 
Id. 
107 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 691.1407 (2012). This statute provides in pertinent part: 
(7) As used in this section: 
(a)“Gross negligence” means conduct so reckless as to demonstrate 
a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury results. 
Id. 
108 OKLA. STAT. tit. 25, § 6 (2012). 
109 Fox v. Okla. Mem’l Hosp., 774 P.2d 459, 461 (Okla. 1989). 
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[an ordinary] negligence claim, differing only as to the degree.”110 Although 
the latter phrase certainly meshes with the statutory definition, the language 
in these cases blurs the distinction between negligent acts and intentional, 
deliberate, or willful actions, contrary to fundamental tort precepts. 
Two Oklahoma cases involving oil well locations illustrate how courts 
apply Oklahoma law to alleged gross negligence actions.111 In one case, the 
court found that drilling a well within defined boundaries without notifying 
the other party did not constitute gross negligence although such action 
could constitute ordinary negligence.112 The court distinguished a prior case 
where a driller relocated a well staked at a specific location without giving 
notice and later attempted to hide its actions.113 The later court differentiat-
ed between apparent inadvertence and a seemingly intentional act.114 
Although gross negligence can serve as a basis for tort liability, its sta-
tus as a separate cause of action varies among the states.115 In some in-
stances, the concept of “gross negligence” has been abandoned in connec-
tion with adoption of a comparative negligence scheme.116 A majority of 
states have passed comparative negligence statutes, potentially obviating 
the need for a separately available gross negligence claim.117 
Many cases involving gross negligence involve alarm systems. Plaintiffs 
often allege gross negligence in order to overcome a contractual limitation of 
liability excluding gross negligence.118 New York courts articulated a more 
stringent standard in the limitation of liability context, where “[g]ross negli-
gence ... is defined as conduct that evinces a reckless disregard for the rights 
of others or smacks of intentional wrongdoing. To constitute gross negli-
gence, the act or omission must be of an aggravated character, as distin-
guished from the failure to exercise ordinary care.”119 Under this heightened 
standard, allegations such as inappropriate installation, inspection failures, 
and inadequate responses represent nothing more than ordinary negligence.120 
                                                 
110 NMP Corp. v. Parametric Tech. Corp., 958 F. Supp. 1536, 1546 (N.D. Okla. 1997). 
111 See Palace Exploration Co. v. Petroleum Dev. Co., 374 F.3d 951, 951 (10th Cir. 
2004); Hamilton v. Tex. Oil & Gas Corp., 648 S.W.2d 316, 316 (Tex. App. 1982). 
112 See Palace Exploration, 374 F.3d at 954. 
113 See Hamilton, 648 S.W.2d at 323–24. 
114 See Palace Exploration, 374 F.3d at 954–55. 
115 See, e.g., Hanks v. Powder Ridge Rest. Corp., 885 A.2d 734, 747–48 (Conn. 2005). 
116 See, e.g., Biegas v. Quickway Carriers, Inc., 573 F.3d 365, 372 (6th Cir. 2009). 
117 See, e.g., id.; Hanks, 885 A.2d at 747–48. 
118 See Shields, supra note 66, § 2. 
119 Am. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Rest Assured Alarm Sys., Inc., 786 F. Supp. 2d 798, 807 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting Travelers Indem. Co. of Conn. v. Losco Grp., Inc., 204 F. Supp. 
2d 639, 644 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (internal quotations & citations omitted)). 
120 See id. at 807–08. 
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Application of the heightened standard sometimes results in summary 
judgment based on the limitation of liability clause.121 Where the plaintiff 
claimed that a burglar alarm company’s failure to wire a skylight properly 
constituted gross negligence, the New York court upheld summary judg-
ment, indicating that such failure, “while perhaps suggestive of negligence 
or even ‘gross negligence’ as used elsewhere, does not evince the reckless-
ness necessary to abrogate [an] agreement to absolve [the alarm company] 
from negligence claims.”122 Likewise, the New York Court of Appeals up-
held a broad limitation of liability that excluded gross negligence.123 The 
court concluded that the defendant’s actions were motivated by economic 
self-interest, which was insufficient to support the reckless disregard 
“smack[ing] of intentional wrongdoing” standard necessary to vitiate the 
limitation of liability.124 In other words, facts that might otherwise warrant a 
finding of “gross negligence” will not suffice to overturn a negotiated limi-
tation of liability. This stricter standard has not been consistently applied, 
however, even in New York.125 
Suffice it to say, based on the examples provided above, there is no 
clearly established definition of “gross negligence.” Court cases do not 
even suggest “you know it when you see it” in all situations.126 Whether 
particular conduct supports a finding of gross negligence is normally a 
question of fact.127 Leaving a decision as to the enforceability of such a 
provision as critical as consequential damages disclaimers to case-by-case 
analysis hardly creates the level of certainty sought by contracting parties. 
                                                 
121 See, e.g., id. at 808. 
122 Colnaghi, U.S.A., Ltd. v. Jewelers Prot. Servs., Ltd., 611 N.E.2d 282, 284 (N.Y. 1993). 
123 See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Noble Lowndes Int’l, Inc., 643 N.E.2d 504, 505–06 
(N.Y. 1994). 
124 See id. at 509. 
125 See Net2Globe Int’l, Inc. v. Time Warner Telecom of N.Y., 273 F. Supp. 2d 436, 
450 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Metro. Life Ins. Co., 643 N.E.2d at 509; cf. Apache Bohai Corp. v. 
Texaco China BV, 480 F.3d 397 (5th Cir. 2007); Sommer v. Fed. Signal Corp., 593 
N.E.2d 1365, 1370–71 (N.Y. 1992). The Apache Bohai court upheld an arbitration award 
where the “arbitrator found that clause unenforceable as against public policy because 
Apache (1) acted with reckless disregard for Texaco’s rights; (2) intentionally abandoned 
the contract; and (3) breached a fundamental obligation of the contract.” 480 F.3d at 406. 
The key to this case may have been the limited review of an arbitrator’s decision confirmed 
by a district court. 
126 Cf. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice 
Stewart declined to define the limits of hardcore pornography, famously saying “I know 
it when I see it.” Id. 
127 See Net2Globe, 283 F. Supp. 2d at 450. 
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VI. TOWARD FREEDOM OF CONTRACT, 
 CONSISTENCY, AND A BRIGHTER LINE 
Undoubtedly, freedom of contract represents a vital underpinning of 
both our legal and commercial systems.128 Consequential damages can easi-
ly reach millions of dollars.129 A plant or business that suffers significant 
downtime, business interruption, or lost profits, especially over an extended 
period of time, can often justifiably claim exorbitant amounts.130 A seller 
may reasonably foresee this quantum of damages, but most sellers are not 
likely positioned to absorb them.131 Therefore, consequential damages limi-
tations clearly form a material part of a company’s risk analysis. Should a 
company be able to rely on the negotiated waiver language unless it has in-
tentionally caused the complained harm? This Article argues that it should, 
for the reasons that follow. 
Based on an examination of section 2-719’s text, one would not be in-
clined to surmise that gross negligence, or even intentional acts, should de-
feat a properly negotiated limitation of liability. The section plainly states, 
“[c]onsequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation 
or exclusion is unconscionable.”132 Comment 3 buttresses the conclusion 
that unconscionability constitutes the only statutory test, since “such terms 
are merely an allocation of unknown or undeterminable risks.”133 As estab-
lished earlier in this Article, unconscionability findings remain “rare” in 
the commercial setting, and such claims should be subjected to a “hard-
headed analysis.”134 
                                                 
128 The United States Supreme Court has underscored this principle’s importance by 
suggesting that the due process clause retains vitality to protect contract rights. See 
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 760 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting 
Allgeyer v. Lousiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897)); Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 
408 U.S. 564, 576–77 (1972); see also Steven W. Feldman, Autonomy and Accountability 
in the Law of Contracts: A Response to Professor Shiffrin, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 177, 222 
n.220 (2009). 
129 See N.Y. State Elec. & Gas v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 564 A.2d 919, 922–23 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1989) (the plaintiff alleging that losses from a generator forced to be off-line for 
over three months caused damages in excess of eight million dollars). 
130 See id. 
131 See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Noble Lowndes Int’l, Inc., 643 N.E.2d 504, 508 (N.Y. 
1994) (noting that the seller “would be under inordinate economic pressure to complete 
performance, being at risk of incurring liability for consequential damages in sums ... many 
times greater than the gross contract price” without a clause limiting liability). 
132 U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (2012); see Posttape Assocs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 537 F.2d 
751, 756–57 (3d Cir. 1976). 
133 U.C.C. § 2-719 cmt. 3. 
134 WHITE & SUMMERS, PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, § 13-11, at 710. 
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Various cases support such a strict textual reading, by adopting an “in-
dependent approach” when evaluating “failure of essential purpose.”135 The 
courts reason that warranty repair remedies and consequential damage 
waivers represent discrete means of handling risks, as measured by different 
standards.136 In other words, the consequential damages waiver stands on its 
own merits for evaluations based on unconscionability.137 No equivalent 
standard exists for caps. Because commercial disputes typically involve per-
formance or warranty issues, it may make sense that a company must spend 
amounts over the cap in order to make a product work. 
What then provides the basis for courts to overturn consequential damag-
es disclaimers based on public policy? One answer stems from the UCC’s 
preservation of supplemental principles of law, including contract law, “[u]n-
less displaced by the particular provision[s].”138 Nevertheless, some courts 
have explicitly or implicitly found that section 2-719 displaces the common 
law regarding the enforceability of limitation of liability clauses.139 If so, 
courts should not maintain a “public policy” exception to enforceability, 
which is unsupported by the UCC language, especially insofar as such a poli-
cy fails to distinguish between exculpatory clauses and liability limitations. 
Several cases applying Pennsylvania law support the analyses recom-
mended in this Article.140 The Pennsylvania Superior Court upheld conse-
quential damages limitations in New York State Electric & Gas Corp. v. 
Westinghouse Electric Corp. (NYSEG).141 In NYSEG, the plaintiff sought to 
recover lost profits and replacement power costs on various theories, includ-
ing negligence, allegedly caused by a defective Westinghouse turbine gen-
erator.142 The court upheld the trial court’s ruling that the claims for these 
consequential damages were barred due to the express contractual limitation 
of liability as well as the economic loss rule.143 The court provided a simple 
                                                 
135 Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. Nat’l Cash Register Corp., 635 F.2d 1081, 1086 (3d Cir. 1980); 
see also Williams, supra note 40, at 135. 
136 See Chatlos Sys., 635 F.2d at 1086; see also Williams, supra note 40, at 135. 
137 See Chatlos Sys., 635 F.2d at 1086. 
138 U.C.C. § 1-103(b) (2012). As the comments discuss, this section was amended to 
clear up some confusion concerning the relationship between the UCC and the common 
law of contracts. 
139 See McNally Wellman Co. v. N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp., 63 F.3d 1188, 1196 (2d 
Cir. 1995); N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 564 A.2d 919, 929 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1989). 
140 See, e.g., Great N. Ins. Co. v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., 517 F. Supp. 2d 723, 753 (W.D. 
Pa. 2007); Valeo v. Pocono Int’l Raceway, Inc., 500 A.2d 492, 493 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). 
141 N.Y. State Elec., 564 A.2d at 920, 930. 
142 See id. at 923. 
143 See id. at 926. 
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and straightforward analysis: “[T]he parties specifically allocated the risks 
of uncertain events and consequences, including the risk that the generator 
would be out of service for some time, by agreeing to a limitation on West-
inghouse’s liability.”144 
Courts have also expressly confronted the significant difference between 
exculpatory clauses and liability limitations.145 Rejecting a buyer’s attempt 
to impose strict scrutiny, an appellate court was 
persuaded that limitation of liability clauses are not disfavored under 
Pennsylvania law; especially when contained in contracts between informed 
business entities dealing at arm’s length, and there has been no injury to 
person or property. Furthermore, such clauses are not subjected to the same 
stringent standards applied to exculpatory and indemnity clauses.146 
As the subsequent federal case Great Northern Insurance Co. v. ADT Securi-
ty Services, Inc.147 confirmed, Pennsylvania courts evaluate each limitation of 
liability based on a three part test to determine whether the clause: “(1) does 
not violate public policy; (2) is part of a contract between private parties and 
relates solely to their private affairs; and (3) is not a contract of adhesion.”148 
Great Northern engaged in the well-reasoned analysis advocated by 
this author, albeit under the common law rather than the UCC.149 After 
finding the limitation of liability generally enforceable, it addressed the 
plaintiff’s contention that the clause’s limitation—restricting the plaintiff 
to $1000—should not apply to situations involving gross negligence.150 
The court distinguished various precedents either dealing with exculpatory 
clauses or analyzing limitations of liability as exculpatory clauses.151 The 
court concluded that Pennsylvania courts would uphold liability limitations 
in the face of alleged gross negligence, and found as a matter of law that 
the limitation applied.152 
The contract language in Great Northern limited liability for “negli-
gence, active or otherwise.”153 The court found this language sufficiently 
                                                 
144 Id. at 925. 
145 See, e.g., Valhal Corp. v. Sullivan Assoc., 44 F.3d 195, 204 (3d Cir. 1995); Great 
N. Ins. Co., 517 F. Supp. 2d at 749. 
146 Valhal Corp., 44 F.3d at 203–04. 
147 Great N. Ins. Co., 517 F. Supp. 2d at 728. 
148 Id. at 747 (citing Emp’rs Liab. Assurance Corp. v. Greenville Bus. Men’s Ass’n, 
224 A.2d 620, 623 (Pa. 1966)). 
149 See id. at 749. 
150 See id. at 751. 
151 See id. at 753. 
152 Great N. Ins. Co., 517 F. Supp. 2d at 753. 
153 Id. at 751. 
2013] CLASHING POLICIES OR CONFUSING PRECEDENTS 515 
broad and clear as to encompass gross negligence.154 By so doing, the court 
relied in part on a Pennsylvania appellate court decision upholding a true ex-
culpatory clause disclaiming liability for “negligence or otherwise” as cover-
ing gross negligence.155 Pennsylvania, like many jurisdictions, has somewhat 
confusing precedents concerning the impact of degrees of negligence.156 
Cases from other jurisdictions reach disparate results, often in the guise 
of evaluating, or relying on precedents involving, actual or supposed excul-
patory clauses.157 These cases perpetuate the use of gross negligence, as 
well as intentional wrongdoing, or lesser standards such as recklessness, as 
a means of overcoming limitations of liability.158 As Justice Rehnquist 
summarized the common law, “‘gross negligence’ is ‘a relative term,’ and 
‘a word of description, and not of definition.’”159 “This distinction between 
acts that are intentionally harmful and those that are very negligent, or un-
reasonable, involves a basic difference of kind, not just a variation of de-
gree.”160 The bottom line is that the term imparts too uncertain a standard 
for judging something as important as contractual limitations of liability. 
Gross negligence exclusions also undercut the “economic loss in tort” 
theory. Consequential damages represent a quintessential example of eco-
nomic or commercial losses.161 If consequential damages cannot be dis-
claimed for gross negligence, then logic suggests that such tort claims for 
“economic losses” would presumably be permitted. Thus, one cannot rec-
oncile adoption of the economic loss in tort principle with maintenance of 
gross negligence as an exception. At least one court has indeed barred tort 
claims founded on gross negligence because there were no duties outside 
of the written agreement.162 
                                                 
154 See id. at 751–52. 
155 Valeo v. Pocono Int’l Raceway, Inc., 500 A.2d 492, 493 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). 
156 Great N. Ins. Co., 517 F. Supp. 2d at 753. 
157 See, e.g., Houghland v. Sec. Alarms & Servs., Inc., 755 S.W.2d 769, 771 (Tenn. 1988); 
Adams v. Roark, 686 S.W.2d 73, 75 (Tenn. 1985). See generally Shields, supra note 66, § 1. 
158 See, e.g., Houghland, 755 S.W.2d at 773; Adams, 686 S.W.2d at 75. 
159 Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 72 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Milwaukee 
& St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Arms, 91 U.S. 489, 493 (1875)). 
160 Id. at 62–63. 
161 See Anzivino, supra note 83, at 1123–24. As Professor Anzivino suggests, citing All-
Tech Telecom, Inc. v. Amway Corp., 174 F.3d 862, 865 (7th Cir. 1999), the “economic loss” 
doctrine could be considered the “commercial loss” doctrine. Despite whatever mysteries 
might otherwise surround the term “consequential damages,” there is no dispute among the 
cases and authorities that such damages are economic in nature. Id.; see also Diamond & 
Foss, supra note 17, at 672. 
162 See NMP Corp. v. Parametric Tech. Corp., 958 F. Supp. 1536, 1547 (N.D. Okla. 1997). 
The NMP Corp. court did not directly apply the economic loss rule since it was not clear 
whether the rule had been adopted in Oklahoma, but the court reached the same result. Id. 
516 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:493 
“Public policy” exceptions should be limited to intentional wrongdoing 
rather than any degree of negligence, this Article suggests. New York courts 
embrace, even if they do not always employ, the “smack[ing] of intentional 
wrongdoing” standard.163 Commentators analyzing consequential damages 
suggest that it is “important to limit expansive liability to those [intentional 
and willful] breaches that are most readily capable of being deterred.”164 
A potential contractual standard to exclude or except limitations of lia-
bility may be framed, as in the wording at the beginning of this Article, as 
“willful misconduct.”165 Although used in a wide variety of statutes and 
conventions, this phrase may not be susceptible to a single precise mean-
ing.166 Indeed, the use of “willfulness” as a standard applied to breach of 
contract actions has been criticized by a prominent contracts scholar as indi-
cating “a childlike faith in the existence of a plain and obvious line between 
the good and the bad, between unfortunate virtue and unforgivable sin.”167 
The term “willful” when coupled with “misconduct” certainly connotes ac-
tual or equivalent knowledge, combined with a repugnant intent or action.168 
The term appears to bear close similarity to “reckless disregard” in some 
contexts, but should still require a degree of awareness almost akin to scien-
ter requirements under criminal law.169 In any case, the term should impart 
conduct greater than gross negligence.170 Flaunting of a legal duty could 
suffice, for example.171 Although companies may not be able to control 
their employees’ intentional acts any more than they can control grossly 
negligent actions, contracting parties can more adequately gauge those acts 
that represent intentional or willful conduct versus acts that fall below the 
                                                 
163 See Sommer v. Fed. Signal Corp., 593 N.E.2d 1365, 1371 (N.Y. 1992). 
164 Diamond & Foss, supra note 17, at 681. 
165 See, e.g., Digital Envoy, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. 5:04-CV-1497RS, 2005 WL 2999364, 
at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2005). It should be noted that exceptions or exclusions may apply 
only to a “cap” on liability rather than to the consequential damages disclaimer as well. 
166 Compare Wells v. Polland, 708 A.2d 34, 44 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998) (noting a 
difference between reckless disregard and willful misconduct), with Saba v. Compagnie 
Nationale Air France, 78 F.3d 664, 667 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (noting that reckless disregard is 
an equivalent to willful misconduct). 
167 5A CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1123 (2012). 
168 See, e.g., Wells, 708 A.2d at 44 (discussing actual knowledge and conscious failure 
to avoid injury). 
169 See Saba, 78 F.3d at 667. 
170 See id.; see also Dazo v. Globe Airport Sec. Servs., 295 F.3d 934, 941 (9th Cir. 2002); 
Arch Chems., Inc. v. Radiator Specialty Co., 653 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1103 (D. Or. 2009). 
171 See Sierra Club v. Franklin Cnty. Power of Ill., LLC, 546 F.3d 918, 935–36 (7th Cir. 
2008). Intentional breach or abandonment of a contract, without tortious acts, should not suf-
fice. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Noble Lowndes Int’l, Inc., 643 N.E.2d 504 (N.Y. 1994). 
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standard.172 To the extent sellers’ contracts so provide, the sellers should 
take responsibility for corporate acts such as a conscious management deci-
sion to take or forego certain critical remedial actions or withhold essential 
information. For example, suppose a company learns that its products con-
tain a latent defect with a high probability of product failure, which as a re-
sult would cause serious economic harm to a prospective plaintiff.173 The 
company makes an informed decision not to notify a customer of the defect 
due to its remedial costs. Several months later, the product indeed malfunc-
tions and explodes, causing a fire at the customer’s factory and millions of 
dollars of property damage. Such a conscious decision may “smack of in-
tentional wrongdoing” and justify holding the company liable for conse-
quential damages, if the contract allows such liability. 
Contrast the above scenario with a situation where a fully trained em-
ployee performs work on a buyer’s product. The employee fails to follow 
industry standards or simply takes a short cut, causing the type of explosion 
and damages described above. How can a company or a court determine 
whether such actions amount to ordinary versus gross negligence? Under 
what circumstances should a company be held liable? The concern with un-
certainty is compounded since the existence of gross negligence is normally 
considered a question of fact.174 
Accepting the proposition that contract language should be enforced, 
courts must still ascertain the parties’ intent to determine what conduct has 
been excluded.175 Certainly, courts must determine that the contract lan-
guage is written so as to cover gross negligence, as in Great Northern.176 
An exclusion of “negligence” should suffice, without the need to distinguish 
gross negligence, as at least some courts have held.177 The sample language at 
the beginning of this Article therefore works, inasmuch as it shows a clear 
intent to exclude or limit claims on any legal theory other than contract. 
                                                 
172 See Wells, 708 A.2d at 45 (discussing willful misconduct in terms of a land owner’s 
liability for injury to a trespasser, noting that “liability for injury to trespassers is imposed only 
in those cases in which the land owner has engaged in conduct calculated to or reasonably 
expected to lead to injury”). Conduct calculated to cause injury is likely more easily identified 
than mere negligent conduct. 
173 This may give rise to a duty to warn under various state and federal laws if personal 
injuries or death may ensue. 
174 See, e.g., Great N. Ins. Co. v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., 517 F. Supp. 2d 723, 751 n.27 
(W.D. Pa. 2007), and cases cited therein. 
175 See id. at 752 n.28. 
176 See id. at 753. 
177 See id. at 752; Valeo v. Pocono Int’l Raceway, Inc., 500 A.2d 492, 493 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1985). But see Hanks v. Powder Ridge Rest. Corp., 885 A.2d 734, 747 (Conn. 2005) 
and cases cited in that opinion. 
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If the parties wish to retain the right to unlimited liability or a lesser 
standard, such as for gross negligence, that right can be incorporated into 
the contract.178 Indeed, many contract provisions do incorporate such lan-
guage.179 There must also remain room for finding unconscionability in 
those rare instances where the circumstances warrant it. Otherwise, courts 
should not disturb a conscious risk allocation using the vagary of gross 
negligence, especially for a provision having as much impact as a conse-
quential damages disclaimer. 
In viewing conscious allocations of risk, several factors lurk in the 
background, including risk mitigation and the contracting parties’ relation-
ships. Companies typically obtain insurance to protect themselves from ma-
jor contractual or project risks.180 Parties take on insurance costs and bur-
dens based in part on their ability to control the underlying risks, and in part 
on their rights or property interests in the damaged property.181 Insurance 
never provides a complete solution, since coverage may not be clear, pre-
miums may increase to reflect payouts, and insurance companies may pur-
sue subrogation claims against the other contracting party based on fault.182 
The extent of the parties’ relationship also matters. Course of perfor-
mance, course of dealing, and trade usage must be considered.183 Often the-
se circumstances arise between companies who have conducted business in 
the past. How the companies have handled issues may help determine their 
respective intentions and influence contract interpretation. Even more like-
ly, standards develop in particular industries or trades.184 In the power gen-
eration industry, for example, it has long been common for companies to 
limit their liability, often in relation to the purchase price for the particular 
contract, and to disclaim consequential, indirect, and similar damages.185 
Willful misconduct is often excluded from such limitations, while gross 
negligence less often appears as an express exception or exclusion.186 
                                                 
178 See Valeo, 500 A.2d at 493. 
179 See generally Shields, supra note 66. 
180 See Great N. Ins. Co., 517 F. Supp. 2d at 744. 
181 See id. at 726. 
182 For an example of a case brought by insurers via subrogation, see Great N. Ins. Co., 
517 F. Supp. 2d at 723. Although insurers as subrogors stand in the shoes of their insureds, 
for purposes of interpreting contract provisions, this presents a curious situation where a 
stranger to the original contract negotiations urges certain contract interpretations. 
183 See generally Michael Pillow, International Commercial Sales and Service Con-
tracts—Negotiation and Enforceability of Limitations of Liability, 21 No. 6 ACCA DOCKET 
62, at *71 (June 2003). 
184 See, e.g., Southland Farms, Inc. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 575 So. 2d 1077, 1081 (Ala. 1991). 
185 John L. Rudy, Limitation of Liability Clauses in Public Utility Tariffs: Is the Rationale 
for State-Sponsored Indemnity Still Valid?, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 1379, 1379–80 (2004). 
186 See generally Pillow, supra note 183, at *67–68. 
2013] CLASHING POLICIES OR CONFUSING PRECEDENTS 519 
CONCLUSION 
Returning to the scenario raised in the introduction, a seller’s status un-
der current law must be characterized as uncertain, even though the parties’ 
intent seems clear enough. The law should follow the analyses employed by 
the NYSEG and Great Northern courts. Where commercial parties have ne-
gotiated contractual terms, and agreed to disclaim consequential damages, 
their bargain should be upheld. The only exceptions that should potentially 
be countenanced are: 
1. Willful misconduct or similar intentional actions; 
2. Those rare instances where unconscionability truly applies; and 
3. Any other exceptions or exclusions expressly agreed to by 
the parties. 
In all of these cases, interpretations should be made based on the par-
ties’ contract, and as a matter of law. If the contract language leaves doubt 
as to the intentions of the parties, that matter may require a threshold resolu-
tion. Where the language is clear, or the parties’ intentions may be readily 
discerned, courts should not disturb the deal. 
